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We compute the welfare cost of egalitarianism|a tax policy that equalizes wages
for all. The benchmark \laissez-faire" economy has features a la Aiyagari (1994) with
endogenous labor supply. A progressive income tax provides insurance against income
risks but at the cost of eciency: it undermines highly productive workers' incentives
to work. We nd that in an economy with the labor-supply elasticity of 1, the welfare
cost of egalitarianism, measured in consumption-equivalence units, is only 1% as the
welfare gain from insurance against income risks nearly osets the eciency loss from
distorting labor eort. However, with an elastic labor supply, the welfare cost of
egalitarianism is as large as 7.5% of steady state consumption.
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Egalitarianism is often popular because it provides insurance against bad outcomes in the
market. At the same time, it is criticized for its eciency loss from distorting individual
choice and incentives. We compute the welfare cost of egalitarianism|a tax policy that
equalizes wages for all.1 The model economy has features a la Aiyagari (1994) with endoge-
nous labor supply and capital accumulation. Workers are identical in preferences and ex ante
ability. They face uninsurable individual productivity shocks and a borrowing constraint.
Workers insure themselves against future income uncertainty by saving and working more
(e.g., Pijoan-Mas (2005)). A progressive tax policy that equalizes after-tax wages (as well as
earnings) is an eective insurance against income risks. However, such a policy is associated
with an eciency loss, since it discourages highly productive workers from working (e.g.,
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008)).
Our benchmark \laissez-faire" economy is calibrated to capture some of the salient fea-
tures of earnings and wealth of the U.S. economy. The stochastic process of the idiosyncratic
productivity shock is estimated by the stochastic process of individual wages from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The intertemporal time preference rate is chosen to
match the average real rate of return of the postwar period. The intratemporal preference
between commodity consumption and leisure (i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure) is calibrated to match the average hours of work observed in the
Michigan Time Use Survey. Our model almost exactly reproduces the cross-sectional distri-
bution of ex post earnings and wealth in the PSID. Equipped with this quantitative general
equilibrium model, we evaluate the welfare cost of the egalitarian policy that equalizes the
after-tax wages of all workers.
We nd that under the egalitarian policy aggregate hours of work increase by 10% relative
to that under the \laissez-faire" economy. The wage compression induces the labor supply to
be drawn from among low productivity wokers who would otherwise supply very few hours
in the market. However, the aggregate labor input measured in eciency units increases by
mere a 2% because the workers with high productivity exert much less labor eort under the
1An extreme form of egalitarianism would be communism. For example, \The whole of society will have
become a single oce and a single factory with equality of labour and equality of pay," from page 91 of The
State and Revolution by V.I. Lenin.
1wage compression. The aggregate capital stock decreases signicantly by 11% in the long
run as the egalitarian policy eliminates the precautionary savings motive against income
risks. In our benchmark economy where the elasticity of labor supply is 1, the welfare
cost of egalitarianism is a mere 1%, measured in consumption-equivalence units, as the
insurance benet nearly osets the eciency loss. However, with elastic labor supply (e.g.,
labor-supply elasticity of 4) the eciency loss increases signcantly and the egalitarianism
decreases average welfare by 7.5%.
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008) rst conducted a quantitative welfare anal-
ysis of an equal-wage policy in an incomplete markets economy. They provide an elegant
and transparent analysis on the trade-o between the insurance gain and the eciency loss
of wage compression. In order to obtain analytical solutions, they abstract from capital. We
extend their analysis to include production capital. It turns out that the long-run conse-
quence of capital accumulation can be quantitatively signicant enough to reverse the welfare
implication of an egalitarian policy. For example, in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2008), the egalitarian policy leads to a welfare gain relative to \laissez faire" unless the
labor supply is highly elastic.2 According to our analysis with capital accumulation, the
egalitarian policy leads to a welfare loss under a moderately elastic labor supply|i.e., the
elasticity of 0.7 or higher.
We provide a novel way to decompose the welfare cost of egalitarianism into insurance
benet and eciency loss by studying an ecient allocation under an economy with com-
plete capital markets (which we refer to \complete markets" economy). When the complete
set of contingent claims is available, workers eectively eliminate income risks by trading
contingent claims, whereas in an incomplete-markets economy, workers have to self-insure
against income risks by saving more and working more (Pijoan-Mas (2005)). While the wel-
fare gap between the \complete markets" and benchmark \laissez-faire" economy reects the
welfare gain from eliminating income risks without distorting labor supply, the welfare gap
between the \complete markets" and the \egalitarian" economies reects the eciency cost
from distorting labor supply only because income risks are completely eliminated in both
2Since the size and nature of productivity risks are not identical between Heathcote at al.'s (2008) and
our model, a direct comparison is not possible. Despite these dierences, according to Heathcote et al., a
complete wage compression leads to a welfare gain when the labor-supply elasticity is less than 2 (under log
utility in consumption).
2economies.3 According to our benchmark calibration, the 1% welfare cost of egalitarianism
consists of a 7% welfare gain from insurance against risks and a 8% loss from distorting
labor eort. The eciency loss crucially depends on the elasticity of labor supply. For ex-
ample, with a labor supply elasticity of 4, the eciency loss can be as large as 38% of the
steady-state consumption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a benchmark model
economy in which the workers face uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In Section
3, we calibrate the model economy to match the ex post earnings and wealth distributions in
the PSID and study the welfare eect of an egalitarian tax policy that compresses after-tax
wages. Section 4 summarizes the results.
2. Model
The benchmark economy has features a la Aiyagari (1994) with endogenous labor supply
(e.g., Krusell and Smith (1998), Pijoan-Mas (2005), and Chang and Kim (2007)). There
is a continuum (measure one) of workers who have identical preferences. Workers are ex
ante identical but ex post heterogeneous due to realized productivity shock x, which follows
a Markov process with a transition probability distribution function x(x0jx) = Pr(xt+1 
x0jxt = x). Individual productivity xt represents idiosyncratic risks that agents face in our
model economy and is the only source of heterogeneity.4







Workers trade claims for physical capital, at, which yields the rate of return rt. The capital
markets are incomplete. Physical capital is the only asset available to workers, and workers
3We assume that the utility is separable between consumption and leisure. Thus, under the complete
markets economy, workers supply labor eort according to their realized productivity: the most productive
worker works the most and the least productive worker supplies the least amount of labor.
4Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2008) allows for two types of productivity shocks: permanent
and temporary (i.i.d.). They assume that temporary productivity shocks are insurable but permanent
productivity shocks are not. Therefore, the market incompleteness in their analysis refers to the permanent
productivity shocks, whereas ours refers to the temporary but persistent productivity shocks as in Aiyagari
(1994).
3face a borrowing constraint: at  a for all t.
The representative rm produces output according to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-
Douglas technology in capital, Kt (which depreciates at rate  each period), and eective
units of labor, Lt(=
R
htxt d), where  is the distribution of workers:5





Without tax, a worker earns wtxtht, where wt is the wage rate per eective unit of
labor xt. For simplicity, the individual state (a;x) is a public knowledge (at least known to
the government) and the government imposes a tax rate (subsidy rate if negative),  1 <





that the government balances its budget:
Z
(at;xt)wtxth(at;xt)d(at;xt) = 0:













wtxth(at;xt)   at+1 and at+1  a:
It is convenient to write (in recursive form) the value function for a worker, denoted by
V (a;x) as:
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5This implicitly assumes that workers are perfect substitutes for each other. While this assumption
abstracts from reality, it greatly simplies the labor-market equilibrium.
4A stationary equilibrium consists of a value function, fV (a;x)g; a set of decision rules for
consumption, asset holdings, and labor supply, fc(a;x), a0(a;x), h(a;x)g; aggregate inputs,
fK, Lg; factor prices, fw, rg; and an invariant distribution of workers (a;x) such that:
1. Individuals optimize: Given w and r, the individual decision rules c(a;x), a0(a;x), and
h(a;x) solve V (a;x).
2. The representative rm maximizes prots:
wt = k
1  (4)
rt +  = (1   )k
  (5)
where k = K=L.
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6This measure of social welfare or its variants have been widely used in the literature. Examples include
Domeij and Heathcote (2004), Young (2004), Pijoan-Mas (2005), Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2008)
and Rogerson (2009). Detailed justications for this welfare measure are provided in Aiyagari and McGrattan
(1998).
5This is the utilitarian social welfare function that measures the ex ante welfare in the steady
state|i.e., the welfare of an individual before the realization of initial assets and productivity,
which is drawn from the steady-state distribution (a;x). We measure the welfare gain or
loss from a policy change by the constant percentage change in consumption each period for
all individuals, which is required to equate social welfare before and after the policy change.

































where c0, h0, and 0 is consumption, labor supply, and steady-state distribution before the
policy change and c1, h1, and 1 are those after. A positive  implies that average welfare
improves upon a policy change. Equation (6) further simplies to:
W1 = W0 +
1
1   
log(1 + ); (7)
where W0 and W1 are social welfare before and after the policy change, respectively. Hence,
 = exp
 





We briey explain the choice of the model parameters. The parameters of the model economy
are chosen to match some key aspects of the U.S. economy. A more detailed explanation of
the calibration can be found in Chang and Kim (2006, 2007). The unit of time is a year. We
assume that individual productivity x follows an AR(1) process: lnx0 = x lnx + "x, where
"x  N(0;2
x). We estimate x and x by estimating the AR(1) process of wages from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for 1979-1992. According to our model, workers
are ex ante identical but ex post heterogeneous due to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In
order to capture ex post heterogeneity only, we rst restrict the sample to arguably ex ante
homogeneous households, whose head is a high school graduate and whose age is between 35
6and 55 as of 1983 (1984 survey). We denote this sample as \PSID Primary Households." We
further control for individual xed eects by including sex, age, and age-squared.7 Finally, we
control for time eects (aggregate business-cycle eect) by annual dummies. The estimated
values we obtain are x = 0:777 and x = 0:266.8
The other parameters are in accordance with the standard values in the literature. The
elasticity of labor eort, , is 1. This value is larger than a typical micro estimate (e..g,
MaCurdy, 1981). However, considering that typical micro estimates do not reect the exten-
sive margin of labor (e.g., labor-market participation decision), it is desirable to use a larger
number for the labor supply elasticity. For example, Heckeman and MaCurdy (1980) nd
that the labor supply elasticity of female workers can be as large as 5 when the participation
decisions are taken into account. In a recent study in which the human capital investment
part of compensation is taken into consideration, Imai and Keane (2004) estimate that the
labor supply elasticity for males is 3.7. According to our earlier work with an indivisible
labor with incomplete capital markets (Chang and Kim (2006)), the aggregate labor-supply
elasticity is about 1. Since the labor supply elasticity is a crucial aspect of eciency loss
under an egalitarian policy, we consider a wide range of  between 0.1 to 4, which constitutes
the lower and upper bounds estimates in the literature. Workers are not allowed to borrow:
a = 0. The labor-income share, , is 0.64, and the annual depreciation rate of capital, , is
10%.
We search for the preference parameter for disutility from working, B, such that average
hours worked are 0.33. According to Juster and Staord (1991), a typical married couple in
the Michigan Time Use Survey spends about one-third of their discretionary time working
for paid compensation. The time discount factor  is chosen so that the real rate of return to
capital is 4% in the steady state (e.g., Kydland and Prescott (1982)). There is no tax in the
benchmark \laissez-faire" economy. While the average hours worked are 0.33 in the steady
state, the aggregate labor input measured in eciency units is 0.36 higher than physical
hours because, on average, workers with higher productivity work longer hours. Due to
7We estimate the AR(1) process of the wage residual using Heckman's (1979) maximum-likelihood esti-
mation procedure, correcting for a sample selection bias because productivities (wages) of workers who did
not work are not reported. See Chang and Kim (2006) for details.
8Our estimate is slightly lower than, but comparable to, the persistence of individual earnings risks in
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1999). The dierence is due to their decomposition of individual shocks
into a persistent AR(1) and purely temporary i.i.d. components, whereas we assume a single AR(1) process.
7precautionary savings, the steady-state interest rate is 4%, while the assumed subjective
time discount rate is 5.3% ( = 0:9493). Table 1 summarizes the parameter values of the
benchmark model economy.
3.2. Cross-sectional Distributions of Earnings and Wealth
Since we investigate the trade-o between insurance against idiosyncratic productivity risks
and eciency loss associated with an egalitarian policy, it is desirable for the model economy
to possess a reasonable amount of income risks comparable to those in the data. We report
the cross-sectional distribution of earnings and wealth of the benchmark economy|two ob-
servable measures of cross-sectional heterogeneity generated by income shocks.
Figure 1 shows the Lorenz curves of household wealth and earnings distributions from
both the \PSID Primary Households" and the model. Household wealth in the PSID (1984
survey) reects the net worth of houses, other real estate, vehicles, farms and businesses
owned, stocks, bonds, cash accounts, and other assets. Household earnings in the PSID are
the sum of earnings of the household head and spouse. Both earnings and wealth distribution
in our model are fairly close to those in the \PSID Primary Households" (which arguably
reects ex post heterogeneity). Specically, the Gini coecients of earnings and wealth
distributions in our model are 0.5 and 0.28, respectively, and those of the \PSID Primary
Households" are 0.53 and 0.32, respectively.9
Table 2 summarizes detailed information on wealth and earnings in both the PSID (1984
survey) and the model. For each quintile group of wealth distribution, we calculate the
wealth share, ratio of group average to economy-wide average, and the earnings share. In
both the data and the model, the poorest 20% of families in terms of wealth distribution
were found to own virtually nothing (about 1% of aggregate wealth). The PSID found
that households in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles own 7.07, 13.01, 21.10, 57.76%
of total wealth, respectively, while, according to the model, they own 5.52, 13.50, 25.88,
54.67%, respectively.10 The average wealth of those in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles is,
9The Gini coecients of wealth and earnings for all households in the PSID 1984 survey are 0.68 and
0.41, respectively.
10One should note that the unconditional wealth distribution is much more skewed than that of \PSI
Primary Households." For example, according to the unconditional wealth distribution (i.e., all households
8respectively, 0.36, 0.64, 1.06, and 2.97 times larger than that of a typical household, according
to the PSID. These ratios are 0.28, 0.67, 1.28, and 2.73 according to our model. Households
in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles of wealth distribution earn, respectively, 14.67, 20.08,
25.07, and 25.86% of total earnings, according to the PSID. The corresponding groups earn
19.58, 20.70, 21.63, and 22.30%, respectively, in the model. The model generates the cross-
sectional dispersions in earnings and wealth that are reasonably comparable to those in the
data. We now investigate the welfare consequence of an egalitarian policy that eliminates
income risks by compressing the after-tax wages.
3.3. Welfare Cost of Egalitarian Policy
It is straightforward to show that under the tax policy (a;x) = 1   1
x, all workers' after-
tax wages, hours, and earnings are identical in the steady state. Under this policy, the
wealth distribution is degenerate, and the equilibrium allocation is equivalent to that of a
representative agent with the mean productivity, x = 1.11
Table 3 compares the steady-state aggregate hours, capital, output, consumption and
social welfare under the egalitarian tax policy. With an egalitarian policy that equalizes
wages regardless of individual productivity, aggregate hours of work increase by 10.1%. The
wage compression draws the labor supply from low-productivity workers who would otherwise
supply very few hours in the market. However, the labor eort in eciency units increases
by mere 2% as highly productive workers exert much less labor eort. Capital decreases
signicantly by 11%. Thanks to perfect insurance against income risks provided by the
egalitarian tax policy, there is no need for precautionary savings. As a result, the economy
produces less output. Output falls by 2% and aggregate consumption is virtually unaected.
Overall, the egalitarian policy reduces the utilitarian social welfare by 1.1%, measured in
consumption-equivalence units.
As illustrated by Heathcote et al. (2008), the egalitarian tax policy highlights the trade-
o between the insurance benet against income risks and the eciency loss from distorting
in the 1984 PSID), from the 1st to 5th quintiles, households own, respectively, -0.52, 0.50, 5.06, 18.74, and
76.22% of total wealth.
11While our model economy allows for trading in a decentralized market, the wealth distribution degener-
ates in the steady state under the egalitarian policy.
9labor eort. In order to decompose this trade-o, we compute the equilibrium under complete
capital markets, where the complete set of contingent claims is available. Under complete
capital markets, the ecient allocation is achieved as workers supply hours according to their
realized productivity. Consumption is equalized for all workers (under the separable utility
between consumption and leisure) and the hours of work is determined by the intra-temporal
optimality condition in (3). The welfare gap between the \complete markets" and the
\egalitarian" economy reects the eciency cost from distorting labor supply because income
risks are completely eliminated in both economies. The welfare gap between the \complete
markets" and benchmark \laissez-faire" economy reects the welfare gain from eliminating
income risks because neither economy is subject to distortion in labor eort other than
precautionary motive. While workers tend to save more and work more for precautionary
motive under incomplete markets economy (Pijoan-Mas (2005)), such distortion is due to lack
of insurance. Thus, we view the welfare gap beween \complete markets" and \laissez-faire"
economies as insurance benet.
The last column of Table 3 reports the aggregate quantities from the \complete mar-
kets" economy. While workers on average work 6.2% less hours than the \laissez-faire," the
labor input measured in eciency units is 4% larger than the \laissez-faire" because highly
productive workers supply more hours. Since there is no need for precautionary savings,
capital decreases by 9.8%. While the aggregate output is smaller in the \complete markets"
economy by 1.2%, aggregate consumption is slightly higher in the \complete markets" econ-
omy. The social welfare gap of 7.3% between the \laissez-faire" and the \complete markets"
reects the welfare gain associated with eliminating income risks. Relative to the \egali-
tarian" economy, the social welfare of \complete markets" is higher by 8.4% which reects
the eciency loss due to distortion of labor eort only because income risks are completely
eliminated in both economies.
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008) rst analyze the trade-o from an equal-
wage policy in a quantitative model. In order to obtain a transparent analytical solution,
they abstract from capital. We extend their analysis with capital. It turns out that the long-
run consequence of capital accumulation can be quantitatively important. For example, in
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008), the egalitarian policy leads to a welfare gain
relative to \laissez-faire" unless labor supply is fairly elastic. According to our analysis with
10capital, the egalitarianism leads to a welfare loss with a moderately elastic labor supply.
While a direct comparison is not possible because the size and nature of productivity risks
are not identical between Heathcote at al.'s (2008) and our model, when both labor supply
elasticity and relative risk aversion are 1, the wage compression improves average welfare by
5% in Heathcote et al. (Panel (C) of Figure 2 in Heathcote at al. (2008)), whereas such a
policy results in a welfare loss in our model with capital.
The elasticity of labor eort is crucial in determining the magnitude of eciency loss
from an egalitarian policy. In our benchmark calibration, we use an elasticity of 1. Although
this value is larger than a typical micro estimate based on prime-age male workers (e.g.,
MaCurdy (1981)), much larger values are preferred once we take into account the so-called
extensive margin of labor supply. For example, Heckeman and MaCurdy (1980) nd that
the labor-supply elasticity of female workers can be as large as 5 when the participation
decisions are taken into account. We re-do our analysis with a wide range of labor supply
elasticities from 0.1 to 4. These values constitute the lower and upper bounds of labor supply
elasticities in the literature. When we use a dierent labor supply elasticity, we re-calibrate
the preference parameters B and  so that avearage hours worked and real interest rate in
steady state are identical across economies. Specically, for each value of , we choose the
parameter for disutility from working B and discount factor  to obtain aggregate hours of
0.33 and a real interest rate of 4% under \laissez-faire." As Table 4 shows, a higher value of
 (less painful to supply additional hours) requires us to lower the value of B (disutility from
working) to yield the same average hours in the steady state. As an elastic labor supply (a
higher value of ) yields higher output and capital, we need a smaller discount factor () to
obtain the same equilibrium interest rate.
Table 5 shows two polar cases ( = 0:1 and 4). When labor supply is inelastic ( =
0:1), the eciency unit of labor (0.34) is barely larger than the average hours of work
(0.33). Compared to the benchmark economy, capital, output, and consumption are smaller.
The egalitarian policy increases the average welfare by 2.4% as the insurance gain (3.2%)
dominates the eciency loss (0.8%). When labor eort is highly elastic ( = 4), the eciency
unit of labor (0.39) is much greater than the average hours of work (0.33). The economy
produces, saves, and consumes more. In this economy, the egalitarian policy decreases the
welfare signicantly by 7.5%. In particular, the eciency loss from distorting labor eort is
11enormous, as large as 38%.
Figure 2 shows average hours of work, hours in eciency units, capital, and consumption
of \egalitarian" and \complete markets" economies (relative to \laissez-faire" steady states).
As  increases, (relative) average hours in the \egalitarian" increase whereas the hours in
the \complete markets" decrease. By contrast, the eciency unit of hours in the \complete
markets" increase sigincantly as the ecient allocation induces much labor eort from
highly productive workers.
Figure 3 exhibits the relative welfare of \egalitarian" and \complete markets" economies.
As expected, the welfare cost rises as the labor supply becomes more elastic so that work-
ers can more easily take advantage of high-productivity opportunities. The welfare under
egalitarian policy (relative to \laissez-faire") turns from a gain to a loss around the labor
supply elasticity of 0.7. This turning point occurs at the elasticity of 2 (under the log utility
in consumption) in Heathcote et al. (2008)'s analysis without capital accumulation.
While the utilitarian criterion is a useful concept for the welfare analysis, one might argue
that the median welfare is important from a political economic perspective. In Figure 4 we
compare the welfare of the median worker based on the steady state distribution (a;x), and
nd that the median worker is better o in the \egalitarian" economy as long as the labor
supply elasticity is less than 2.
4. Summary
We compute the welfare cost of egalitarianism|a tax policy that equalizes individual wages.
In our benchmark \laissez-faire" economy, workers are identical in preferences but face a
borrowing constraint and uninsurable individual productivity shocks. Workers can insure
themselves against income risks by working and saving more. A progressive tax policy
can provide insurance against income risks. However, insurance is obtained at the cost of
eciency: it undermines highly productive workers' incentives to work|the trade-o high-
lighted by Heathcote et al. (2008). We nd that the equal-wage policy decreases aggregate
capital by 11% in the long run. Aggregate hours of work increase by 10%, while the la-
bor input measured in eciency units increases by a mere 2% as productive workers exert
12less labor eort. The welfare cost of egalitarianism, in consumption-equivalent units, is 1%.
This welfare cost consists of a 7% welfare gain from insurance against income risks and a
8% welfare loss due to distortion in labor eort. The eciency loss depends crucially on the
elasticity of labor supply. With elastic labor supply (elasticity of 4) the eciency loss from
an egalitarian policy can be as large as 38% of steady state consumption, which results in a
welfare cost of 7.5% despite perfect insurance against income risks.
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15Table 1: Parameters of the Benchmark Economy
Parameter Description
 = 0:9493 Discount factor
 = 1 Labor-supply elasticity
B = 7:16 Utility parameter
a = 0 Borrowing constraint
x = 0:777 Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shock
x = 0:266 Standard deviation of innovation to idiosyncratic productivity
 = 0:64 Labor share in production function
 = 0:1 Capital depreciation rate
16Table 2: Characteristics of Wealth Distribution
Quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Total
PSID Primary Households
Share of wealth 1.03 7.07 13.01 21.10 57.76 100
Group average/population average 0.05 0.36 0.64 1.06 2.97 1
Share of earnings 14.29 14.67 20.08 25.07 25.86 100
Benchmark Model
Share of wealth 0.68 5.52 13.50 25.88 54.67 100
Group average/population average 0.03 0.28 0.67 1.28 2.73 1
Share of earnings 15.78 19.58 20.70 21.63 22.30 100
Notes: The PSID statistics reect the household wealth and earnings in the 1984 survey. The
statistics of \Primary Households" are those for household heads whose education level was
12 years and whose age is between 35 and 55. The participation rate is based on individual
employment status (household head and spouse) for the same group.
17Table 3: Steady States: Benchmark
\Laissez-faire" \Egalitarian" \Complete Markets"
(Levels) (relative to \Laissez-faire") (relative to \Laissez-faire")
Labor Hours 0.33 + 10.1 % - 6.2 %
Labor in Eciency Units 0.36 + 2.2 % + 4.0 %
Capital 1.57 - 11.4 % - 9.8 %
Output 0.61 - 2.9 % - 1.2 %
Consumption 0.45 + 0.1 % + 1.8 %
Social Welfare - 1.1 % + 7.3 %
Notes: The numbers for \egalitarian" and \complete markets" economies are relative to the
benchmark economy. The social welfare is in consumption-equivalence units.
18Table 4: Cablibrated values of B and  under various 
 .1 .2 .4 .6 .8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
B 14450 593 37.78 15.04 9.45 7.16 4.07 3.365 3.05
 .95494 .95426 .95294 .95167 .95046 .9493 .94437 .94061 .93772
Notes: Given the labor-supply elasticity (), we choose the parameter for disutility from
working (B) and discount factor () to yield the average hours of work of 0.33 and real rate
of return of 4% in the \laissez-faire" steady state.
19Table 5: Steady States under inelastic and elastic labor supply
\Laissez-faire" \Egalitarian" \Complete Markets"
(Levels) (relative to \Laissez-faire") (relative to \Laissez-faire")
Inelastic Labor:  = 0:1
Labor Hours 0.33 + 1.6 % - 0.5 %
Labor in Eciency Units 0.34 + 0.8 % + 0.4 %
Capital 1.47 - 6.8 % - 7.1 %
Output 0.57 - 1.9 % - 2.3 %
Consumption 0.42 - 0.3 % - 0.7 %
Social Welfare + 2.4 % + 3.2 %
Elastic Labor:  = 4
Labor Hours 0.33 + 18.3 % - 26.8 %
Labor in Eciency Units 0.39 + 0.4 % + 26.7 %
Capital 1.71 - 23.2 % - 3.2 %
Output 0.67 - 8.8 % + 15.0 %
Consumption 0.50 - 3.7 % + 21.4 %
Social Welfare - 7.5 % + 30.3 %
Notes: The numbers for \egalitarian" and \complete markets" are relative to \laissez-faire."
The social welfare is measured in consumption-equivalence units.
20Figure 1: Lorenz Curves of Earnings and Wealth






































Notes: The PSID statistics reect the household wealth and earnings in the 1984 survey. The
statistics of \Primary Households" are those for household heads whose education level was
12 years and whose age is between 35 and 55. The participation rate is based on individual
employment status (household head and spouse) for the same group.
21Figure 2: Steady-State Comparison
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Notes: The numbers for \egalitarian" and \complete markets" are relative to \laissez-faire."
22Figure 3: Social Welfare

































Notes: The social welfare is measured in consumption-equivalence units relative to the
\laissez-faire."
23Figure 4: Welfare of the Median

































Notes: The numbers for \egalitarian" and \complete markets" are relative to \laissez-faire."
24